Market · In-house nuclear seats

Nuclear and SMR project lawyers.

A design assessment on a published calendar, a long-lead procurement signature that will not wait for it, and a legal seat most companies open eighteen months after the moment it was worth most. Read when nuclear licensing and procurement counsel belongs on the payroll, who employs it today, and what it costs to find out late.

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01 Start here

When does a small modular reactor program put a lawyer on its own payroll?

Six lenses on one timing decision. Across 750 structured interviews with London legal buyers, the general counsel who had already opened this seat put it in the same place on the calendar: after the regulator had docketed something, and before the first contract nobody could unwind was signed.

Lens 01 · The ceiling The review now has a published ceiling on it.

An executive order of May 2025 caps a Nuclear Regulatory Commission decision on new construction or operation at 18 months, and on continued operation at one year, against a stated national target of 400 GW of nuclear capacity by 2050. A date you can staff against.

One lens in six argues against the hire, and it is the one a chief financial officer raises first. The test that answers it is in section 06.

18 months
Ceiling on an NRC decision for new construction or operationOne year for continued operation; target of 400 GW by 2050
Executive order, May 2025
27 and 22
Months from application acceptance to construction permitKairos Power Hermes, 2021 to 2023; TerraPower Kemmerer, 2024 to 2026
US NRC; US Department of Energy, 2026
GBP 2.5bn
Pledged when a UK vendor was named preferred bidderSite confirmed at Wylfa five months later, contract signed in April 2026
GOV.UK, June 2025 and November 2025
$1.52bn
Federal loan for the first US commercial reactor restart800 MW at Covert Township, Michigan, subject to NRC approval
US DOE Loan Programs Office
02 The thesis

The seat is worth most while the regulator is still reading.

Nuclear legal capability is bought in a band that opens when a design assessment starts and closes when the first contract nobody can unwind is signed. Most companies open the requisition after that band has closed.

Nuclear hiring is usually described as a function of construction. It is not. The documents that decide whether a reactor project survives are written in a narrow band before anything is built: what the applicant tells the regulator, what the purchase orders say about a permit that does not exist yet, and what the power agreement promises about a commissioning date nobody controls. That band has a public start and a public end.

The start is a docket. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's advanced-reactor pages set out the route — a modernized rule set at 10 CFR Part 53, a prospective applicant guide, a construction oversight program — and publish no requirement about who represents an applicant. In Britain the equivalent start is Generic Design Assessment: the Office for Nuclear Regulation records GE Vernova Hitachi's BWRX-300 as completing assessment in December 2025 and Holtec's SMR-300 in March 2026, with Rolls-Royce SMR still under review after advancing a step in July 2024.

The end is a signature. In the UK program the ladder from negotiation to contract is fully dated: negotiations opened with four shortlisted vendors on 11 November 2024, an invitation to submit final tenders followed on 28 February 2025, Rolls-Royce SMR was named preferred bidder on 10 June 2025 with more than GBP 2.5 billion pledged, Wylfa was confirmed as the first site on 13 November 2025, and the contract was signed in April 2026, on the UK government's own announcements. Eighteen months separate the first of those from the last, and every one of them needed a different kind of lawyer.

The clearest public evidence that capability is retained early rather than at the milestone is a law firm's own disclosure: Ashurst stated in April 2026 that it had been advising on UK SMR delivery since 2023. One firm on one program is not a market average, and it is not a rule about how firms are engaged. Read as a date, though, it is unambiguous: the legal work started roughly three years before the event that made the newspapers.

That makes the timing question a cost question rather than a headcount one. A company hiring during design assessment competes with almost nobody. A company hiring after financial close competes with the vendor, the engineering contractor, the lender's advisers and the offtaker for the same handful of people, all of whom found the same gap in the same quarter. Sartori's London mandate telemetry puts counter-offer incidence at 32 percent across the in-house book and the median offer-to-acceptance window at 13 working days. Neither number improves when four employers want one candidate.

Regulator still readingMoney already committed

  1. Design assessment The regulator holds the design and the applicant holds the correspondence. Nothing has been ordered. Counsel here shapes what is filed and what is conceded.
  2. Long-lead procurement Forgings, fuel and site works are ordered against a permit that does not exist. Every clause allocates a risk the regulator has not yet resolved.
  3. Financial close Terms are fixed and the lenders' counsel has read them. A lawyer hired at this point inherits documents rather than writing them.
A company that hires at financial close is not late by a quarter. It is hiring after the documents that decide the project have been signed.
On the timing
03 The calendar

The dates are public, and none of them belong to you.

Three jurisdictions run this on published schedules set by regulators, ministries and boards. The internal owner has to be in post before each date, not appointed because of it.

The American record holds two completed reviews, which is enough to measure a window and not enough to call it an average. Kairos Power's Hermes test reactor application was accepted on 29 September 2021 and its construction permit issued on 14 December 2023, roughly 27 months, on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's docket record. TerraPower's Kemmerer Unit 1 was accepted in May 2024 and permitted in March 2026, roughly 22 months, on the Department of Energy's March 2026 announcement. The May 2025 executive order sets a ceiling of 18 months against both.

A restart is not one filing but a portfolio of them. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's docket for the Crane Clean Energy Center records four separate licensing actions: an exemption filed on 19 November 2024, an operating license and technical specifications revision on 31 July 2025, a physical security plan revision on 24 October 2025 that drew a request for additional information on 29 May 2026, and an emergency plan reinstatement on 31 October 2025. A draft environmental assessment issued on 3 June 2026, with the final version projected for September 2026. Four clocks, one project, and no single external firm watching all four by default.

Europe runs two speeds. Britain is a procurement market with the regulatory question settling; France is still a licensing-strategy market. EDF's EPR2 estimate was revised to EUR 72.8 billion for six reactors at Penly, Gravelines and Bugey in December 2025, up from EUR 67.4 billion in 2023, with a final investment decision targeted for the end of 2026, as World Nuclear News reported. The Penly construction license public inquiry closed in March 2026 and the joint European pre-review of EDF's Nuward design finished its second phase in December 2025, on the World Nuclear Association's France profile. The French regulator, formed on 1 January 2025 from the merger of the safety authority and the radiation-protection institute, counts about ten of roughly eighty SMR projects under study worldwide as French.

Buyers meet this calendar late and in the wrong document. Of the 750 structured interviews in Sartori's London program, 94 respondents were general counsel or heads of legal at energy and infrastructure companies, and over a 24-month window 38 of those 94 said the first nuclear-specific legal question their company faced arrived inside a procurement or offtake contract rather than inside a licensing filing. The regulator's calendar reached them through a purchase order.

Sortable by any column. Dates are the issuing body's own; the right-hand column is the capability that has to exist inside the company by then.
Date What lands Who sets it What the company needs in post
11 Nov 2024 Negotiations open with four shortlisted reactor vendors Great British Nuclear Buy-side negotiation counsel, before any vendor is chosen
19 Nov 2024 First of four separate restart licensing actions docketed at Crane Nuclear Regulatory Commission An owner who can run four dockets on four clocks at once
10 Jun 2025 Rolls-Royce SMR named preferred bidder, more than GBP 2.5bn pledged UK government Contract counsel between selection and signature
22 Jul 2025 Sizewell C final investment decision, about GBP 38bn UK government and shareholders Regulated Asset Base and shareholder documentation
13 Nov 2025 Wylfa confirmed as the first site, up to 3,000 peak jobs Great British Energy - Nuclear Planning, land and community counsel local to Anglesey
Mar 2026 Holtec SMR-300 completes assessment; Kemmerer construction permit issued ONR and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Construction-phase contracting and oversight readiness
Apr 2026 First UK SMR contract signed Great British Energy - Nuclear and the vendor Supply-chain and change-control counsel in post on day one
18 May 2026 Finding of no significant impact for an industrial-site reactor project Nuclear Regulatory Commission An offtaker's own environmental and permitting counsel
Months between the acceptance of an advanced-reactor application and the construction permit, against the ceiling now set for the same decision.

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing record; US Department of Energy, March 2026; executive order, May 2025.

Every date on that list belongs to somebody else. The only variable a company controls is whether it has an owner in post when the date arrives.
On who owns the schedule
04 Who employs it

Four buyers sit around one reactor, and none writes the same requisition.

The developer, the utility, the component supplier and the industrial offtaker all need nuclear-adjacent legal capability. Only one of them usually has a lawyer who has read a regulator's correspondence.

01

The developer

Designs and licenses a reactor and sells it. Legal weight sits on the regulatory file, the fuel supply and, once listed, on capital markets: X-energy's April 2026 listing raised over $1 billion and needed capital markets, tax, environmental, cybersecurity and government-contracts counsel at once.

02

The utility or restart operator

Owns an operating license or wants one back. The Crane restart runs as four separate licensing actions filed between November 2024 and October 2025, with a final environmental assessment projected for September 2026. The buyer most likely to already carry regulatory lawyers.

03

The component and fuel supplier

Sells forgings, modules, instrumentation or fuel into a program not yet permitted. Its legal problem is export control, government contracting and warranty exposure against a schedule its customer does not control.

04

The industrial offtaker

Signs a long-term power agreement or hosts a reactor on its own site. Constellation's 2026 proxy discloses a twenty-year agreement for a 1,121 MW plant with a technology offtaker; a chemicals producer took an environmental finding for a Texas site reactor in May 2026.

What none of those four buyers discloses is a nuclear lawyer. Across the 2026 proxy statements of five nuclear and advanced-reactor companies — a listed small-reactor developer, an advanced-fission developer, a naval and isotope manufacturer, a power-equipment group and a development-stage microreactor company — the senior legal seat is a General Counsel or Chief Legal Officer bundled with the corporate secretaryship, compliance or corporate strategy. Not one discloses a standalone nuclear licensing or regulatory-affairs title among its officers. At a large utility with reactors in its fleet, the 2026 proxy puts nuclear oversight in a board committee and names no legal function against it.

The job boards say it more bluntly. On 3 September 2026 the two developers whose career sites could be read end to end carried 63 and 22 open requisitions, spanning reactor systems, fuel recycling, instrumentation and manufacturing, and not one of the 85 titles contained the words counsel, attorney, legal or compliance. The nearest thing on either board is a regulatory engineer, which drafts license-application content and is not a qualified legal seat.

Where the people come from is inconsistent enough to be worth stating plainly. Of the two companies whose 2026 proxies describe how their senior legal officer arrived, one came from a large-firm capital markets practice and the other from government-affairs and general counsel roles at aviation and drone-airspace companies. The two paths point in opposite directions, and a job description that gates on nuclear experience selects against both.

Open roles on the two developer career sites readable end to end on 3 September 2026, against the number carrying a legal, counsel, attorney or compliance title.

Company-hosted careers boards, accessed 3 September 2026.

Delegated outwardNamed on the payroll

  1. Board committee Nuclear sits with directors and an operating unit. No legal title carries it, and nobody reads the regulator's correspondence week to week.
  2. Bundled general counsel Corporate secretary, compliance and the licensing file share one desk. It holds until two dockets run at once, then it does not.
  3. Standing licensing and procurement seat One named owner holds the regulator correspondence and the long-lead contracts together. It appears once a program has a permit and a build.

The same 94-respondent segment shows how far the gap runs. Over the same 24-month window, 61 of the 94 told us no lawyer at their company had read the regulator's design-assessment or docket correspondence in full: an engineer had, an external firm had, or nobody had. The segment includes listed utilities and industrial groups with legal departments in the dozens.

A head of legal at a European utility running a new-build program put the consequence to us directly in Sartori's London interview program: for two years his company had sent an engineer, not a lawyer, in front of the regulator, and the first legal review of that correspondence happened when a lender asked to see it. He was not describing a mistake anybody had made deliberately. He was describing what happens when the licensing file has no owner whose job it is.

The market has not written a job title for this work. It has written the job description and left it inside somebody else's.
On the missing title
05 What the seat holds

One project, several dockets, and a contract stack the regulator never sees.

Licensing is the visible half. The other half is a set of commercial documents written against a decision that has not been made yet, which is where the money is actually lost.

The commercial half runs in parallel with the regulatory half and rarely reports to the same person. Long-lead procurement commits a buyer to forgings, pressure vessels, instrumentation and fuel before a permit exists. Offtake agreements commit a seller to a commissioning date a regulator can move. Financing conditions — a federal loan, such as the $1.52 billion facility the US loan office committed for the 800 MW Palisades restart, or the Regulated Asset Base framework behind Sizewell C's roughly GBP 38 billion final investment decision in July 2025 — attach covenants to licensing milestones. The same underlying risk, allocated three times, by three teams.

The breadth is visible in the one transaction where legal staffing was published. When an advanced-reactor developer listed in April 2026, raising over $1 billion on 44,254,659 shares priced at $23.00 against a marketed range of $16 to $19, its counsel fielded a team spanning capital markets, tax, regulatory, environmental, compliance, cybersecurity, disclosure and government contracts across eight offices, on the firm's own announcement. That is a panel, and also a description of what one in-house owner has to instruct, sequence and challenge.

The same six workstreams, seen from each side of the regulator's decision.
Workstream Before the decision After the decision
Regulator correspondence Drafts and reviews what is filed; decides what the applicant concedes and what it defends Answers requests for additional information against a clock the company did not set
Long-lead procurement Writes termination, escalation and schedule-relief terms for an unissued permit Administers terms already signed, and pays for whatever was not written
Offtake and power agreements Prices licensing risk into availability, delay and change-in-law provisions Manages delivery obligations that assumed a commissioning date
Financing Aligns the loan or Regulated Asset Base conditions with the licensing sequence Reports covenant compliance and evidences conditions precedent
Site, planning and land Runs option agreements, environmental review and community commitments Defends consents already granted and manages construction disputes
Export control and supply Structures technology transfer and vendor qualification before orders are placed Audits shipments and remediates classifications that were never checked

Sartori's London mandate telemetry covers 24 closed in-house searches over the trailing three years. Seven of those 24 sat in energy and infrastructure regulatory scope, and three of the seven were briefed only after the company had already selected a technology vendor. Those three ran at the top of our stated four-to-seven-month band rather than the middle, because the brief arrived with a fixed commercial date attached to it and no room to widen the search. That is the measurable cost of the timing this article is about, and it is our own number, not a market estimate.

Two composites from that segment, described by category only. A listed utility with a new-build program asked for a senior regulatory lawyer at director level four months after choosing its vendor; the search ran five months, the hire came from a national regulator rather than from private practice, and the counter-offer came from a competing developer the client had never listed as a rival for talent. A component supplier serving two reactor programs asked for one lawyer to carry export control and supply contracting together; two shortlists failed on export-control depth rather than on nuclear knowledge, and the seat took six months to fill from a defense-manufacturing legal team.

A general counsel at an industrial offtaker negotiating a long-term power agreement gave us the sharpest version of the problem in the same interview program: the licensing risk in his contract had been reviewed by three external firms and by nobody who would still be at the company when the plant was commissioned. Continuity, not expertise, was what he could not buy from a panel.

06 The crossing test

Which comes first, the decision or the signature?

One question decides whether this belongs on the payroll. Put the regulator's expected decision and the first contract you cannot unwind on the same line, and see which one is on the left.

If the signature falls before the decision, the company is carrying licensing risk inside a commercial document, and the person who wrote that document should be on the payroll. If the decision falls first, the risk is narrower, the documents are written against a known outcome, and a panel firm can carry it. That is the whole test, and the reason it works here rather than in most sectors is that both dates are public: the regulator publishes its schedule and the company knows its own procurement plan.

The arithmetic is not comfortable. A ceiling of 18 months against observed reviews of 22 and 27 months means most programs place long-lead orders inside the gap rather than after it, and fleet programs make that worse: the design assessment is completed once, the commercial file repeats per site. The UK confirmed Wylfa on 13 November 2025 for at least 1.4 GW across three units, and nearly GBP 900 million of contracts had been placed under that program by June 2026, more than 70 percent of it with UK-registered companies, on the government's own figures.

How long a company waits between a docketed application and a decision: the two advanced-reactor construction permits actually issued, against the ceiling now set for the same decision.
Observed and capped range
0 months36 months

Ceiling on a decision for new construction or operation

One year for continued operation

Executive order, May 2025

Britain is buying; France is still filing. The same job title means different work in the two markets, and a candidate who has done one has not done the other.

  • Britain is a procurement seat. Two designs completed Generic Design Assessment between December 2025 and March 2026, on the Office for Nuclear Regulation's record, while site, supply chain and change control are opening at Wylfa.
  • The financing is structural, not bilateral. Sizewell C reached a final investment decision on 22 July 2025 at about GBP 38 billion under a Regulated Asset Base framework, and the National Wealth Fund committed up to GBP 599 million to the reactor company in April 2026.
  • France is a licensing-strategy seat. The EPR2 final investment decision is targeted for the end of 2026, the Penly public inquiry closed in March 2026, and the regulator itself is new: the safety authority and the radiation-protection institute merged into one body on 1 January 2025. A hire made against the old structure is reading the wrong organization chart.

The United States is running new build, restart and industrial co-location at the same time, which is why the seat there is defined by the number of dockets rather than by the size of the plant.

  • The federal money is already out. The loan office reported $129.6 billion issued and $52.8 billion disbursed as of 31 July 2026, including $1.52 billion for a restart and up to $12 billion of guarantees behind Vogtle.
  • Industrial offtakers are applicants now. A chemicals producer's Texas site drew a finding of no significant impact for a reactor project on 18 May 2026, which makes the offtaker a licensing counterparty rather than a customer.
  • The only public pay anchor is federal. A Senior Attorney posting at the regulator, GG-15, $169,279 to $197,200 in Rockville, Maryland, closing on 14 September 2026. It is a public-sector figure and it is the only one this article will quote.

Run the test, then write the brief against the file rather than the label. Ask which regulator correspondence the candidate drafted, which long-lead or offtake contract they negotiated against an unissued permit, and which environmental review they carried end to end. Nuclear-specific knowledge is teachable in months; the habit of writing a commercial document around an unresolved regulatory question is not. That is what the brief should test for.

Our quarterly survey has run since 2019, and the 2026 waves put a number on what actually moves this work. Asked what finally converted panel work into a payroll line, 27 of the same 94 energy and infrastructure respondents named a fixed external deadline rather than budget, volume or a change of general counsel. The deadline is the buying trigger, which is why the calendar in section 03 is the practical hiring document.

Budget the process, not only the package. Sartori's London in-house desk has worked this market for more than ten years, closed 24 searches over the trailing three years at a 93 percent completion rate, and records a median of 13 working days between offer and acceptance, with counter-offers in 32 percent of processes. A search opened against a fixed commercial date has less room to absorb either number. That is the practical reason the earlier hire is cheaper.

Common questions about nuclear and SMR project lawyers

When should a company put nuclear licensing counsel on its own payroll?

When a contract you cannot unwind will be signed before the regulator decides. The two advanced-reactor construction permits actually issued ran 27 and 22 months from application acceptance, on Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Department of Energy records, and long-lead procurement is placed inside that gap. A company that waits for the permit is hiring someone to read documents already executed.

Does a small modular reactor program need different counsel from a large reactor project?

Same licensing discipline, denser calendar. A fleet program writes the regulatory file once and repeats the commercial file at every site, the reverse of a single large build. The UK shows it plainly: the Office for Nuclear Regulation assesses the design centrally while site, planning and supply-chain contracting run against Wylfa. One lawyer who owns both halves is rare; two who each own one half and never speak is the common failure.

Who actually employs nuclear project lawyers in-house today?

Almost nobody, under that name: across five nuclear and advanced-reactor companies' 2026 proxy statements, not one discloses a nuclear licensing title. The senior legal seat is a bundled General Counsel or Chief Legal Officer carrying the corporate secretaryship or compliance instead. At one large utility, nuclear oversight sits in a board committee rather than in a named legal function. The work is real; the job title is somebody else's.

What does this seat pay?

No clean public band exists for the private side. The one directly observable figure is a regulator's own posting: a Senior Attorney at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pay plan GG-15, $169,279 to $197,200 in Rockville, Maryland, on a 2026 announcement. Comparable private figures are published mainly by search and staffing companies, which this article does not cite. What Sartori reports instead is process cost: 32 percent counter-offer incidence across its London in-house book.

What credential should the job description ask for?

None exists, so ask for a file instead. The two disclosed career paths into these seats contradict each other: one senior legal officer arrived from a large-firm capital markets practice, the other from government-affairs and general counsel roles in aviation and drone regulation, on 2026 proxy statements. Ask which regulator correspondence the candidate drafted, which contract they negotiated against an unissued permit, and which environmental review they carried.

What is the risk of hiring too early?

Real, dated, and already paid by somebody. The Carbon Free Power Project was terminated on 9 November 2023 after its estimate rose from $3.6 billion to $9.3 billion, and the developer cut 154 staff, 28 percent of headcount, as World Nuclear News reported. Plant Vogtle finished above $30 billion against a 2009 projection of $14 billion, on Energy Information Administration figures published in 2024. Hire against a docketed application, not an announcement.

07 Sources

The executive orders, the regulators' dockets, the government announcements and the companies' own filings.

Licensing dates are the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's, the Office for Nuclear Regulation's and the French safety authority's. Program and financing figures come from GOV.UK, the National Wealth Fund and the US loan office. Company structure comes from 2026 proxy statements. The internal figures are Sartori's own.

Sources and further reading

36 references
  1. Sartori & Partners — London Legal Talent Research Programme (750 structured interviews; ~30,000 lawyers mapped; quarterly surveys since 2019; mandate telemetry) sartoriglobal.com ↗
  2. The White House — Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (May 2025) whitehouse.gov ↗
  3. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission — Hermes (Kairos Power) new facility licensing record nrc.gov ↗
  4. US Department of Energy — NRC Issues Construction Permit for TerraPower's Natrium Advanced Reactor (9 March 2026) energy.gov ↗
  5. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission — Crane Clean Energy Center licensing actions nrc.gov ↗
  6. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission — Advanced Reactors, including 10 CFR Part 53 and the Prospective Applicant Guide nrc.gov ↗
  7. US Department of Energy Loan Programs Office — Palisades energy.gov ↗
  8. US Department of Energy Loan Programs Office — Portfolio, as of 31 July 2026 energy.gov ↗
  9. US Energy Information Administration — Plant Vogtle Unit 4 begins commercial operation (1 May 2024) eia.gov ↗
  10. World Nuclear News — Idaho SMR project terminated (9 November 2023) world-nuclear-news.org ↗
  11. GOV.UK — Negotiations begin for UK's small modular reactor programme (11 November 2024) gov.uk ↗
  12. GOV.UK — GBN at final stage of small modular reactor selection process (28 February 2025) gov.uk ↗
  13. GOV.UK — Rolls-Royce SMR selected to build small modular nuclear reactors (10 June 2025) gov.uk ↗
  14. GOV.UK — North Wales to pioneer UK's first small modular reactors (13 November 2025) gov.uk ↗
  15. GOV.UK — Sizewell C gets green light with final investment decision (22 July 2025) gov.uk ↗
  16. GOV.UK — UK SMR programme at Wylfa hitting target for British contracts (24 June 2026) gov.uk ↗
  17. National Wealth Fund — National Wealth Fund commits up to GBP 599m to Rolls-Royce SMR (13 April 2026) nationalwealthfund.org.uk ↗
  18. Office for Nuclear Regulation — Generic Design Assessment onr.org.uk ↗
  19. World Nuclear News — EDF estimates EPR2 programme costs at EUR 72.8 billion (18 December 2025) world-nuclear-news.org ↗
  20. World Nuclear Association — France country profile (Nuward joint review; EPR2 schedule) world-nuclear.org ↗
  21. Autorite de surete nucleaire et de radioprotection — Petits reacteurs modulaires reglementation-controle.asnr.fr ↗
  22. Autorite de surete nucleaire et de radioprotection — institutional site (merger of ASN and IRSN) asnr.fr ↗
  23. USAJOBS — Senior Attorney, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, GG-15, Rockville, Maryland (2026) usajobs.gov ↗
  24. Ashurst — Ashurst advises on signing of first UK small modular reactor contract with Rolls-Royce SMR (30 April 2026) ashurstperkinscoie.com ↗
  25. Latham & Watkins — Latham represents X-energy, Inc. in upsized IPO (24 April 2026) lw.com ↗
  26. ESG Today — Amazon-backed nuclear tech company X-energy raises over $1 billion in IPO (24 April 2026) esgtoday.com ↗
  27. X-energy — newsroom, including the NRC finding of no significant impact for the Seadrift, Texas project (18 May 2026) x-energy.com ↗
  28. SEC EDGAR — Constellation Energy Corporation, DEF 14A (19 March 2026) sec.gov ↗
  29. SEC EDGAR — NuScale Power Corporation, DEF 14A (15 April 2026) sec.gov ↗
  30. SEC EDGAR — Oklo Inc., DEF 14A (21 April 2026) sec.gov ↗
  31. SEC EDGAR — BWX Technologies, Inc., DEF 14A (18 March 2026) sec.gov ↗
  32. SEC EDGAR — GE Vernova Inc., DEF 14A (3 April 2026) sec.gov ↗
  33. SEC EDGAR — Dominion Energy, Inc., DEF 14A (19 March 2026) sec.gov ↗
  34. SEC EDGAR — Deep Fission, Inc., DEF 14A (17 June 2026) sec.gov ↗
  35. Oklo — company careers board, accessed 3 September 2026 job-boards.greenhouse.io ↗
  36. Kairos Power — company careers board, accessed 3 September 2026 job-boards.greenhouse.io ↗

Review lengths are computed from two published milestones each, application acceptance and permit issuance, on two projects rather than an average. Capital figures are as reported on the date cited, unconverted. Job-board counts are a single-day census of two career sites. The pay band is one public-sector posting, not a survey. Sartori figures come from the London interview cohort, the quarterly survey and mandate telemetry, and are internal.

For the sector-wide hiring picture this seat sits inside, see is energy transition law hiring in 2026. For the decision itself — what a company buys when it moves work from the panel to the payroll for the first time — see hiring your first General Counsel.

A quiet conversation

Deciding whether nuclear counsel belongs inside the company?

We map in-house legal talent across London, Paris and Washington, and we are as willing to say a mandate is not ready as to open a search. Confidential, no obligation.