Portability in Sacramento is a professional duty before it is a compensation model. Formal Opinion No. 2020-201 of the State Bar Standing Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct asks what ethical obligations arise when a lawyer departs a firm. The digest says the departing lawyer and the firm each put the client ahead of their own interests. If the departure is a significant development for a client, each of them must communicate the fact of the departure and explain the change so the client can make an informed choice of counsel. During the departure they protect confidences and avoid conflicts. If either side cannot handle the matter competently, or the client changes counsel, rule 1.16 requires reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice. Both sides cooperate in the transition. The opinion interprets rules 1.1, 1.4, 1.7, 1.10, 1.16, 1.18, 5.1, 5.2, 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3, and Business and Professions Code section 6068(e). The committee states that the opinion is advisory only and is not binding on the courts or on the State Bar of California.
The opinion is explicit about who it covers and about who owns the client. The duties are the same whether the departing lawyer is a partner or shareholder, a non-equity partner, an associate, or of counsel. Clients do not belong to the firm or to the lawyer. A compensation system that pays origination credit can make a client look, inside the partnership, like one partner's property. The opinion says the California Supreme Court has held otherwise: clients are not the property of any law firm or lawyer. The notice, joint or separate, should tell the client that the lawyer is leaving, when, where the lawyer is going and how to reach them, whether each side is able and willing to continue, that the client may stay with the firm, go with the lawyer, or choose someone else, and who will handle the matter until the client decides. The opinion does not turn that list into a number of weeks of garden leave. A start-date memo that inserts a market notice period is writing a number the opinion did not publish.
The covenant is the next document, and California splits it. Rule 5.6 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, in the State Bar's 2026 compilation, says that unless authorized by law a lawyer shall not participate in offering or making a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or similar agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement that concerns benefits upon retirement. The same paragraph bars a restriction on practice tied to settlement of a client controversy. Paragraph (b) bars an agreement that precludes reporting a violation of the rules. The Supreme Court approved the rule effective 1 November 2018. Comment [1] points the reader to Business and Professions Code section 16602 and to Howard v. Babcock (1993) 6 Cal.4th 409, 425.
Section 16602, amended effective 1 January 2003, is the partnership instrument. Any partner may, upon or in anticipation of a dissolution of the partnership or a dissociation of the partner, agree that he or she will not carry on a similar business within a specified geographic area where the partnership business has been transacted, so long as any other member of the partnership, or a person deriving title to the business or its goodwill from such a member, carries on a like business there. The statute is a geographic covenant tied to dissolution or dissociation, and it lasts while another partner continues a like business in that area. Comment [1] to Rule 5.6 treats that statute, and Howard, as the place to read paragraph (a)(1). A hiring committee that receives a partnership deed should read section 16602 and the deed together, before it writes a start date.
The employment ban is section 16600. As amended by Assembly Bill 1076, effective 1 January 2024, subdivision (a) says that except as provided in the chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void. Subdivision (b) says the section shall be read broadly, in accordance with Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP (2008) 44 Cal.4th 937, to void any noncompete agreement in an employment context, or any noncompete clause in an employment contract, no matter how narrowly tailored, that does not satisfy an exception in the chapter. Subdivision (b)(2) says that direction is declaratory of existing law. Subdivision (c) says the section is not limited to contracts where the restrained person is a party. Section 16600.1, added by the same bill, makes it unlawful to include a noncompete in an employment contract that does not satisfy an exception, and it required employers, by 14 February 2024, to notify current employees and former employees employed after 1 January 2022 that such a clause was void, by a written individualized communication to the last known address and email address.
Section 16600.5, added by Senate Bill 699 and effective 1 January 2024, says any contract that is void under the chapter is unenforceable regardless of where and when the contract was signed. An employer shall not attempt to enforce such a contract regardless of whether the contract was signed and the employment was maintained outside California, and shall not enter a new contract that includes a void provision. Doing so is a civil violation. An employee, former employee, or prospective employee may sue for injunctive relief, actual damages, or both, and a prevailing employee recovers reasonable attorney's fees and costs. That private action is an employment remedy. It does not rewrite section 16602. An income partner, a counsel, or an associate on an employment contract is inside the employment frame unless an exception applies. An equity partner's covenant sits in the partnership agreement, which is the 16602 question Howard and comment [1] already point to. The water-resources file waited 60 days because the receiving firm could not yet see which clients would choose to move, which is the opinion's question, and which relationships the deed actually restrained, which is the statute's question.